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I. INTRODUCTION
The explosion of the United States trade deficit in the last decade or
so' has produced a bumper crop of self-appointed experts offering various
cures for the competitive decline of key domestic industries. Among their
less obvious diagnoses is that the United States government strangles
domestic businesses through the antitrust laws, which forbid industrial
cartels that might be better able to match the competitiveness of the
Japanese.2 For good or ill, the Bush Administration has hewn a path fairly
1. The United States merchandise trade balance ballooned from -$24.2 billion in 1980 to
-$152.1 billion in 1987, an increase of 528%, before recovering slightly in 1988. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 804 (1 0th
ed. 1990).
2. Among the foremost proponents of this position is Professor George C. Lodge of the
Harvard Business School. See, e.g., George C. Lodge, It's Time for an American Perestroika, ATL.
MONTHLY, Apr. 1989, at 35. Those opposed to this position disparage its proponents as "co-
rporateers," who "start with the assumption that any American business corporation ought to be
able to do pretty much what it wants to do, especially if it is encountering offshore competition."
Robert G. Harris & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Horizontal Merger Policy: Promoting Competition and
American Competitiveness, 31 ANTITRUST BuLu. 871, 882 (1986).
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close to this corporatist orthodoxy,3 and Congress has also appeared
willing to loosen the hold of antitrust laws on United States industry in
some circumstances. 4
Congress has recently considered another proposal to ease United
States antitrust laws in order to improve the international competitiveness
of domestic industries.5 The proposed National Cooperative Production
The contention that international competitiveness requires minimal antitrust enforcement
is not new. Forty years ago, the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument of the
Timken Roller Bearing Company that their conduct should be immune from condemnation under
the Sherman Act because it was "reasonable in view of current foreign trade conditions." Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951). See infra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Timken case.
3. The United States Department of Commerce has been among the most important hotbeds
of corporatism in recent years, most notably so under the late Secretary Malcolm Baldridge.
Harris & Sullivan, supra note 2, at 872 n.5; see also Malcolm Baldridge, Two Areas of Antitrust
Law in Need of Reform, 1983 DET. C.L Rev. 1035. In the Bush Administration, Vice President
Dan Quayle said that "[t]o make America more competitive, we are also going to have to
reexamine our antitrust policies, many of which may be anachronistic in this age of global
competition." Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks Before the National Foreign Trade Council
and the National Association of Manufacturers Coalition for Employment Through Exports 5
(June 20, 1989), quoted in Harvey M. Applebaum, Antitrust and the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 557, 566 (1989). Other examples of adherence to the
corporatist view abound:
[Tihe presence of foreign competition increases society's desire to reduce false
positives by government enforcers.... [A]n overly interventionist enforcement policy
will quickly fall into disfavor if it hampers the ability of domestic firms to increase
their efficiency and so their ability to compete with foreign rivals.... [O]ne can
argue that in the late seventies popular support for our antitrust laws had begun to
erode precisely because of the perception that they unduly hampered the ability of
American firms to compete.
Internationalization of Antitrust-Antitrust Division Chiefs Views 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
50,019, at 48,588 (1989); see also Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust,
and Transnational Cartelization, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 433, 435-36 (1991) (quoting remarks
of Bush Administration officials); Y.S. Lanneaux, Recent Development, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 245,
250-51 (1991) (discussingthe United States agreement during its Structural Impediments Initiative
with Japan to pursue various modifications in its antitrust laws). For further discussion of the
antitrust implications of the Structural Impediments Initiative, see infra note 140 and accompa-
nying text.
4. See, eg., Export Trading Company Act, S 306, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233, 1243
(1982) (codified at 15 U.S.C. S 4016 (1988)); National Cooperative Research Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 4301-4305 (1988)). The National Cooperative
Research Act (NCRA) lays the foundation upon which Congress proposes to erect the National
Cooperative Production Amendments. For a detailed discussion of the NCRA, see infra part III.B.
5. This Note is being prepared for publication before the convening of the 103d Congress.
The new Congress, however, may choose to consider legislation substantially similar to that
discussed herein, especially considering the bipartisan support previous versions of the legislation
have received in the House of Representatives.
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Amendments 6 (Amendments) are designed to encourage United States
businesses to engage in transnational joint ventures with foreign rivals to
produce new products.
This Note evaluates the Amendments as presently formulated, in light
of the historical leniency with which United States antitrust law has treated
transnational joint ventures, and concludes that the proponents of the
Amendments have not made their case. Proponents seek to graft the
Amendments onto an earlier piece of legislation, the National Cooperative
Research Act (NCRA), 7 but the supporting literature analogizing from the
NCRA is inapposite. Transnational production joint ventures pose risks to
the United States domestic market that research joint ventures do not.
While proponents of the Amendments have largely dismissed these risks as
inconsequential, this Note seeks to take such risks seriously.
Finally, this Note considers several possible alternatives to the
Amendments. The best option would remake the Amendments in the
image of Article 85 of the European Community's Treaty of Rome.8 Such
an approach would, like the present draft of the Amendments, foster
production joint ventures beneficial to consumers. This proposal also
improves upon the present draft of the Amendments in two respects. First,
it provides more of the business certainty claimed to justify the Amend-
ments, and second, it more effectively protects consumers from ventures
harmful to them.
II. THE JOINT VENTURE
To say that two or more businesses have formed a "joint venture" is
to say very little. The label "joint venture," standing alone, says nothing
about the risks a cooperative business arrangement may pose to com-
petition and, therefore, nothing about its evaluation under the antitrust
laws of the United States.9 A brief overview of what arrangements
constitute joint ventures for the purpose of antitrust analysis will clarify the
issues examined later in this Note.
6. S. 940, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. SS 401-402 (1991), microformed on Sup. Dos. No. Y
1.4/1:102-1-144 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office); H.R 1604, 102d Cong., 1stSess. (1991), microformed
on Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.4/6:102-1-172 (U.S. Govt Printing Office).
7. 15 U.S.C. SS 4301-4305 (1988).
8. See infra part V.C.
9. HERBERT HOVENKA.,P, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW S 4.3, at 111 (1985).
"[Tihe term is of little use in categorizing structure or conduct with particular market
consequences." Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures under the Antitrust Laws: Some Reflections on the
Significance ofPenn-Olin, 82 HARV. L Rv. 1007, 1007 (1969), reprinted in 15 J. REPRINTS FOR
ANTITRUST L & ECON. 181 (1984); see generally 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1478 (1986).
[Vol. 28:119
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A. Definitions of Joint Venture
Two business firms may engage in a wide variety of collaborative
conduct, any of which might loosely be termed a "joint venture." At one
extreme is the merger. The two firms cease to be separate economic
entities; "one ...survives and the other disappears."1o A merger of
competitors, called a horizontal merger, produces greater antitrust concern
than a merger of a customer with its supplier, termed a vertical merger,
because the former reduces the number of competitors in the market by
one and increases the market share of the surviving firm." Less suscepti-
ble to challenge under antitrust laws are vertical mergers, which produce
neither of those competitive threats.12
At the other extreme is the cartel, a simple agreement among
competitors not to compete on price or on price-related marketing
policies.' 3 The members of a cartel "coordinate their activities, but ...
remain under separate ownership and control,"14 unlike the parties to a
merger. Cartels almost completely lack any redeeming economic virtue
such as the creation of new productive capacity or realization of economies
of scale' 5 and are therefore "declared illegal per se-that is, illegal on their
face .... ",16
Joint ventures occupy the middle ground between mergers and
cartels.' 7 Like a merger, a joint venture may allow its members to
"achieve certain economies, either by allowing them to do something at a
lower cost, or else by permitting them to do something for themselves that
they would otherwise purchase on the marketplace or do without."18 Like
a cartel, a joint venture can be used for "price-fixing, output restriction,
... monopoly-creating market division[,]"' 9 or for simply pressuring a
reluctant co-venturer into compliance with whatever course of action the
10. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 988 (6th ed. 1990).
11. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 11.1.
12. Id. SS 7.3-7.4. But see LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST
5 210 (1977) (discussing several possible anticompetitive effects of vertical mergers).
13. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 215 (6th ed. 1990).
14. SULLIVAN, supra note 12, S 59, at 152.
15. For a discussion of the economic effects of cartelization, see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 405 (1978).
16. Robert Pitofsky, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis ofJoint Ventures, 74 GEo. L.J. 1605,
1605 (1986).
17. Id. at 1605-06.
18. HoVENKAmP, supra note 9, §4.3, at 111. "[J]oint ventures, like mergers, frequentlyallow
substantial efficiencies of integration to be achieved without the disappearance of one or more of
the business partners." Pitofsky, supra note 16, at 1606.
19. HOvENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.3, at 111.
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other venturers wish to pursue.20 The wide range of possible conduct
between the extremes of merger and cartelization, however, limits the
usefulness of the observation that joint ventures share some of the
characteristics of each.21
A particular subspecies of joint venture has attracted most of the
scholarly attention over the last few decades. This type of venture involves
two parent organizations jointly incorporating a new firm, in which they
each participate as half owners.22 By excluding cases in which both the
parents and the resulting venture are all foreign23 or all United States
corporations, an analysis of joint ventures presents four possibilities.
First, two United States firms could jointly incorporate a foreign
firm.24 If the foreign firm then operates solely in the foreign market, the
United States parent corporations risk potential antitrust liability only if the
venture produces a "direct and substantial effect on U.S. foreign com-
merce."25 Conduct occurring wholly outside the United States is within
20. The power of a group of cartel-minded venturers over an uncooperative co-venturer
stems from their ability to reduce the value of the co-venturers stake in the venture:
Firms producing competing goods at independent plants might form a joint venture
as a means of increasing punishment threats and therefore the amount of self-
enforcing collusion. A joint venture member, for example, might breach a cartel
agreement by producing more than its cartel quota at its independent plant. The
cartel might then use its voting power deliberately to mismanage the joint venture.
.. . [M]ismanagement will ... lower the value of the breaching firm's capital
contribution [to the joint venture corporation] ....
Ian Ayres, How Cartels Punish. A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L Rv.
295, 311 (1987).
21. Pitofsky, supra note 16, at 1606.
22. Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1007. "Since separate incorporation permits the partners to
limit their liability to the assets of the new venture, it is the method generally employed." Mark
R. Joelson & Joseph P. Griffin, Multinational Joint Ventures and the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 VA.
J. INT'L L. 487, 490 (1975) (footnote omitted), reprinted in 15 J. REPRINTs FOR ANTITRUST L &
EcoN. 403 (1984). In reality, no one has ever counted the number of joint ventures involving two
parents with equal ownership shares, leaving no way to judge the merit of the focus on such
structures in academic literature. However, it appears that transnational joint ventures in which
United States parent corporations own 50% or less of the venture substantially outnumbered those
in which United States corporations had a majority interest. See KAREN J. HLADIK, INTERNA-
TIONAL JOINT VENTURES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF U.S.-FoREIGN BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS
10-11, 41 (1985).
23. See infra note 34.
24. Joelson & Grifm, supra note 22, at 490.
25. 2 WILBUR L FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 1 1.1, at 211 (4th
ed. 1991). The "direct and substantial effect" doctrine is a jurisdictional prerequisite to, not a
substitute for, the ordinary determination of anticompetitive effect which gives rise to antitrust
liability. Antitrust liability does not attach merely on a finding that a "direct and substantial
effect" on United States commerce has occurred, for even lawful conduct can produce such an
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the reach of United States antitrust law if it "has or is intended to have [a]
substantial effect within ... [United States] territory.2 6  Another
formulation of the same principle holds that extraterritorial conduct is
actionable under United States law "if a principal purpose of the conduct
... is to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the ...
conduct has some effect on that commerce."27 The required effect on
United States commerce can be found completely within the United States
or in the nation's export trade.28 Absent some effect on United States
effect.
Of course, just because there is an effect on the United States economy sufficient to bring
a particular foreign business practice within the reach of the United States antitrust laws does not
necessarily indicate that the United States can or will attack the practice. First, United States
antitrust enforcement authorities may face political or diplomatic obstacles to challenging conduct
occurring within the borders of a foreign sovereign. See KURT R. MiRow & HARRY MAURER,
WEBS OF POWER: INTERNATIONAL CARTELS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 220-24 (1982). Second,
in what might become a future trend, the United States recently concluded an agreement with the
European Economic Community providing in part that either party may ask the other to challenge
an action affecting its commerce but occurring within the other party's borders. Competition
Laws Co-Operation Agreement 1991, Sept. 23, 1991, U.S.-E.E.C., arts. 4-6, [19911 4 C.M.L.R.
823.
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
5 402(1)(c) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS]; see also id. S 402
cmt. d. This principle is often traced to Judge Learned Hand's opinion in the Alcoa case, United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding the Sherman Act
applicable to conduct occurring outside the borders of the United States which affects the foreign
commerce of the United States).
However, "even under Alcoa there must be both an intent to affect and an actual effect on
U.S. foreign or interstate commerce." Joelson & Griffin, supra note 22, at 496 n.43. See generally
2 FUGATE, supra note 25, 511.4; Russell J. Weintraub, The Extraterritorial Application ofAntitrust
& Security Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choice-of-Law"Approach, 70 TEx. L REv. 1799
(1992); Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws to Acts
Occurring in Foreign Commerc4 40 A.L.R. FED. 343, S 3 (1978 & Supp. 1991).
The Second Circuit's decision in Alcoa carries the weight of a United States Supreme Court
decision, since it decided Alcoa under a statute, now 28 U.S.C. S 2109 (1988), lodging conclusive
power over certain cases in a specially constituted circuit court of appeals when the Supreme
Court is unable to raise the requisite six-Justice quorum. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL COURTS S 105, at 730-31 & nn.36-37 (4th ed. 1983).
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 26, S 415(2). But see Wilbur
L. Fugate, The New Justice Department Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations-A Reflection of Reagan and, Perhaps, Bush Administration Antitrust Policy, 29 VA. J.
INT'L L. 295, 300-03 (1989) (criticizing the Restatement's formulation of the "effects doctrine"
as inconsistent with United States statutes and court decisions). The Export Trading Company
Act of 1982 codified the "effects test" in 15 U.S.C. 5 6a (1988), which makes the Sherman Act
inapplicable to conduct not having a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
United States commerce. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
236'a (1991 Supp.).
28. 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15, 234b, at 255.
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commerce, though, foreign companies owned by United States enterprises
will be immune from antitrust liability in the United States.
Second, a United States firm and a foreign firm could jointly
incorporate a United States firm.29 This arrangement with a domestic
firm poses more pronounced antitrust risks because it is unnecessary to
question whether a United States firm's conduct affects commerce in the
United States.
Third, a United States firm and a foreign firm could jointly incorpo-
rate a foreign firm.' 0 United States firms must utilize this arrangement
to gain access to some foreign markets, especially markets of less developed
countries (LDCs), because some foreign governments impose local-
participation requirements on foreign direct investment.' 1  For that
reason and others, these types of arrangements are among the most popular
forms of transnational joint ventures.' 2
Finally, two foreign firms could jointly incorporate a United States
firm.3 As with the United States-foreign arrangement, the venture's
effect on United States commerce will never be questioned, and liability for
the foreign parent corporations is a real possibility 4
B. Types of Joint Ventures
Much of the literature in this area divides joint ventures into two
categories, "research and development" and "production and marketing,"
reflecting the purposes for which the ventures were formed.35 Yet if such
a framework was ever adequate to analyze the competitive effect of joint
ventures, it has certainly failed the test of time. Splitting those two
29. Joelson & Griffin, supra note 22, at 490.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 491. Regarding the perceived importance of local ownership requirements, see
PAUL W. BEAMISH, MULTINATIONAL JOINT VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 33-34, 35
(1988).
32. For reasons United States firms might choose to penetrate a foreign market in this
manner, see Joelson & Griffin, supra note 22, at 491-92. Joelson & Griffin's data from the mid-
1970s found that over two-thirds of all transnational joint ventures involved a United States firm
joining a foreign partner to create a venture in the foreign country. Id. app. at 538.
33. Id. at 490.
34. Joelson & Griffin also provide a fifth possibility-that two foreign firms could jointly
incorporate a foreign firm. Id. In spite of this possibility, when no United States entity is a party
to the joint venture, the effect of the venture on United States commerce seems more tenuous,
and accordingly there should be fewer occasions for a challenge to such a venture under United
States antitrust law. Of course, a foreign joint venture formed to export goods to the United
States could have the requisite effect.
35. See, e.g., THOMAS V. VAlcmucs, ANTITRUST BAsIcS SS 10.02-10.03 (1986).
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categories into four-"research," "product development," "production,"
and "marketing"-better facilitates examination of the different competitive
risks posed by each type of joint venture.36
Economic theory and federal antitrust law conceptualize production as
a vertical process, with abstract research at the "top," successive stages of
production in the "middle" in descending order, and final retail sales to
ultimate consumers at the "bottom." 37  Competitors at any particular
stage in the production process stand in a "horizontal" relationship with
each other, while buyers and sellers stand in a "vertical" relationship.38
The prevailing belief holds that cartelization of a "lower" level in the
production process poses a greater threat to consumers than does carteliza-
tion of a "higher" level. For example, if a monopoly develops in the realm
of pure research, many competing firms may still purchase the monopolist's
research results. Those competitors may then develop, produce, and market
different products to consumers.39 If a monopoly develops in the retail
sale of a product, though, it deprives consumers of all alternatives-they
must buy from the monopolist or do without. For that reason, the
Supreme Court has frequently sided with challengers who use antitrust laws
to attack joint sales agencies among competitors and has held these
arrangements unlawful.40
It is fairly well settled that cooperative research poses minimal threats
to competition.41 At the other extreme, cooperative marketing is recog-
36. Although the NCRA covers joint "research and development" ventures, 15 U.S.C.
4301(a)(6) (1988), the proposed Amendments sanction only cooperative production, not
marketing, implicitly recognizing the four-part division proposed here. See infra note 146 and
accompanying text.
37. See generally supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
38. A firm that internalizes a business transaction by expansion or merger in which it might
have participated as a buyer or seller has "vertically integrated." See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID
L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 11 (1983).
39. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Beyond Per Se, Rule of Reason or Merger Analysis: A New
Antitrust Standard for Joint Ventures, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) ("The parties to a research
and development joint venture can, for example, compete in the ultimate production and sale of
products that use the ventures technology.").
40. See, e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (invalidating cooperative
marketing arrangement under the rule of reason); Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332 (1982) (invalidating cooperative marketing arrangement under the per se rule); see also
Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 95 HARV. L REv. 1521, 1555 & nn.107-110
(1982), reprinted in 15 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 281 (1984); cf Broadcast Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23 (1979) (upholding cooperative marketing
arrangement "where [an] agreement on price is necessary to market the product at all.").
41. "[T]he closer... [any] joint activity is to the basic end of the research spectrum... the
more likely it is to be acceptable under the antitrust laws." ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE CONCERNING RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES 3 (1980), reprinted in
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
nized as so dangerous to competition that courts have held it illegal per
se-that is, illegal on its face without further inquiry into the precise
competitive effects of a particular arrangement. In the four-part schema
sketched out above, research joint ventures may be least detrimental to
consumers, with product-development ventures posing some threat to
competition, production ventures creating a stonger threat to competition,
culminating in a level of presumptive illegality in marketing joint ventures.
The traditional analysis easily acknowledges that production joint
ventures pose a greater threat to competition than research joint ventures.
As a practical matter, though, many cooperative business arrangements,
even if labeled a joint venture, will not fall neatly into any of the four
previously enumerated categories. For example, in the case of United States
v. Ivaco, Inc.,42 one of the Justice Department's few recent challenges to
a production joint venture, the court noted that the defendants' cooperative
activities under the venture might include research as well as produc-
tion.43
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 992, at 1, 2 (spec. supp. Dec. 4, 1980) [hereinafter DOJ
RESEARCH JoINT VENTURE GUIDE]; HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.3 & at 114 n.13. But see
SuLLivAN, supra note 12, S 105 (discussing possible pro- and anticompetitive effects of
cooperative research).
42. 704 F. Supp. 1409 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
43. Id. at 1417 n.4. The court rejected the defendants' argument that the joint venture was
necessary in order to develop a new technology to compete with a foreign firm. Id.
[Vol. 28:119
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III. JOINT VENTURES UNDER UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
A. Background
1. Applying the Clayton Act to Joint Ventures
Justice Clark's opinion in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.44
laid to rest any suspicion that the Clayton Antitrust Act45 did not apply
to joint ventures and discussed the possible anticompetitive effects of joint
ventures in admirable detail. The case involved a challenge by the
Government to a joint venture created by two large chemical companies for
the production of sodium chlorate.46 Each of the parent companies,
Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corpora-
tion, owned fifty percent of the stock of the joint venture and was equally
represented on the ventures board of directors.47 Either Pennsalt or Olin
Mathieson could have entered the sodium chlorate market alone and made
a profit, but it was doubtful that either could have succeeded if both had
entered.48 Since only one firm could have profitably entered the sodium
chlorate market, the lower court found that it made no competitive
difference whether that firm was Pennsalt, Olin Mathieson, or their joint
venture and accordingly upheld the joint venture arrangement. 49
The Supreme Court, on direct appeal from the trial court, disagreed.
The Court held that the fatal flaw in the joint venture arrangement was its
elimination of the potential competition that Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson
44. 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (5-4 decision). The majority vacated the opinion of the court below,
which had upheld the Penn-Olin joint venture, and remanded the case. The four dissenters
disagreed with the majority, but also disagreed with each other about why the majority was wrong.
Justices Black and Douglas would have held the venture illegal as a horizontal market division
arrangement without remanding the case to the district court. See id. at 177-83 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Harlan saw nothing wrong with the arrangement and would have upheld it,
rather than give the Government a second chance to win its case in the district court. See id. at
183 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice White dissented without opinion. See generally Pitofsky,
supra note 9.
45. Specifically, S 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. S 18 (1988). This portion of the Clayton
Act is normally applied to mergers, not joint ventures. SuLLivAN, supra note 12, S 202.
Although, "[o]verall, the same considerations apply to joint ventures as to mergers .... ." Penn-
Olin, 378 U.S. at 170.
46. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 161-67.
47. Id. at 163.
48. Id. at 172-73.
49. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 130-31 & n.25 (D. Del. 1963),
rev'd, 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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would have posed to each other.50 Had either Pennsalt or Olin Mathieson
entered the sodium chlorate market alone, its behavior would have been
kept in check by "the potential competition of the corporation that might
have remained at the edge of the market, continually threatening to
enter."s'
The proposed Penn-Olin joint venture might have produced several
other anticompetitive effects. For example, it was considered impossible
that the joint venture would ever compete with Pennsalt or Olin
Mathieson,52 whereas an independent company might. More subtly, the
risk existed that the parent corporations, accustomed to cooperating in the
management of the joint venture, might extend their cooperation into other
areas of business until they were in effect no longer competitors.5 3
50. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 173-74. But see HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, 5 12.4, at 329
(describing the "potential competition" doctrine as "a relic of an earlier era."). Professor
Hovenkamp reasons that "[p]otential competition is really actual competition assessed from the
supply side rather than the demand side.... A firm's knowledge that its price increase will flood
the market with new sellers is competition just as 'actual' as its knowledge that a price increase
will cost a loss of many customers." Id. at 328.
Professor Hovenkamp apparently discards any distinction between making a threat and
effectuating it. Consider the many practical differences between that competition, even on the
supply side, one might call "potential" and that one might call "actual." An actual competitor
of a supplier may already produce substantially similar products exhibiting a high cross-elasticity
of demand with the supplier's own. A potential competitor, though, may not operate in the
supplier's market at all and may not have the ability to bring a substantially similar product to
market without some sizeable and risky investment in new productive capacity, thus posing a far
more remote threat to the supplier. The reduced immediacy of the supply competition in the
latter scenario renders its competition "potential" rather than "actual." Professor Hovenkamp
appears to assert that a firm is not a "potential competitor" if its entry into actual supply
competition with a seller is something other than a swift, immediate "flood [of] the market" with
competing products. Id. Such a definition reads "potential" out of "potential competition"
altogether.
51. Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 173.
52. The Court described the competition-dampening effect of the Penn-Olin venture as
follows:
If the parent companies are in competition, or might compete absent the joint
venture, it may be assumed that neither will compete with the progeny in its line of
commerce. Inevitably, the operations of the joint venture will be frozen to those
lines of commerce which will not bring it into competition with the parents, and the
latter, by the same token will be foreclosed from the joint venture's market.
Id. at 169.
53. See Pitofsky, supra note 9, at 1013-14. Pennsalt and Olin Mathieson had entered into
a sweeping cooperation agreement before creating the joint venture. The agreement essentially
provided that "each party would advise the other of any plans independently to enter the market
before it would take any definite action on its own." Penn-Olin, 378 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J.,
with whom Justice Black joins, dissenting).
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2. Applying the Sherman Act to Joint Ventures
Thirteen years before its decision in Penn-Olin, the Supreme Court in
the Timken case54 ruled that a transnational joint venture could be con-
demned under the Sherman Act.55 The Timken Roller Bearing Company,
a United States corporation, entered into a series of agreements with its
partially owned subsidiaries British Timken, Ltd., a British corporation, and
Societe Anonyme Franpaise Timken, a French corporation. 56 The Court
found that the agreement contained four anticompetitive purposes:
[T]he contracting parties have (1) allocated trade territories
among themselves; (2) fixed prices on products of one sold in the
territory of the others; (3) cooperated to protect each other's
markets and to eliminate outside competition; and (4) participat-
ed in cartels to restrict imports to, and exports from, the United
States.5 7
The Court rejected Tiniken's contention that the agreements should be
permitted, since they simply amounted to a joint venture of the firms.
Instead the Court stated that it found no support for "the proposition that
agreements ... to suppress competition.., can be justified by labeling the
project a 'joint venture."'58
3. The Modern Treatment of Transnational Production Joint Ventures
A controversial decision by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
1984 broke sharply from the Penn-Olin rationale and upheld a transnational
54. Y"mken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), overruled by
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984).
55. 15 U.S.C. SS 1-7 (1988).
56. In the Copperweld case, the Court held that there could be no "conspiracy" between a
corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary, and hence no violation of S I of the Sherman Act.
467 U.S. at 777. The Timken Court held that the two foreign firms conspired with the United
States firm which partly owned them. It is unclear whether partial ownership is sufficient to
confer the Copperweld immunity from S 1 liability. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.2, at 92
n.1. But see Leaco Enters., Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 737 F. Supp. 605, 608-09 (D. Or. 1990)
(granting summary judgment for defendant accused of conspiring with its 91.9%-owned
subsidiary, on the grounds that the parent and partly owned subsidiary shared a "unity of
purpose"). Nevertheless, no challenge to the Timken Court's recognition that the Sherman Act
applies to joint ventures has materialized.
57. Timken, 341 U.S. at 596.
58. Id. at 598 (Black, J.).
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production joint venture between General Motors and Toyota.59 Appar-
ently rejecting the Penn-Olin Court's statement that "the same consider-
ations apply to joint ventures as to mergers,"60 the Chairman of the FTC
justified the venture on the grounds that it was "a limited production joint
venture, not a merger of GM and Toyota." 61  Nonetheless, the venture
raised serious competitive questions because it allowed GM and Toyota,
ostensible competitors, to exchange a tremendous amount of information
related to each company's price structure.62 Such information exchanges
between competitors can facilitate collusion, especially in highly concentrat-
ed markets. 63 In spite of these competitive risks, the FTC upheld the
venture, a sign that the FTC, at least, is already willing to approve
transnational production joint ventures even when they contain elements
acknowledged by the Supreme Court and most commentators to invite
collusion.
59. General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 374 (1984) (3-2 decision). The FTC's decision
upholding the GM-Toyota venture probably generated as much profit for the publishers of law
journals as it did for the two automobile manufacturers. See generally John E. Kwoka, Jr.,
International Joint Venture: General Motors and Toyota, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 46 (John
E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989); Symposium, Perspectives on the General
Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 31 WAYNE L Rav. 1163 (1985); Richard F. Nelson, The GM-Toyota
Joint Venture and its Implications Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1984 DET. C.L. R v.
647; Robert C. Weinbaum, Production Joint Ventures: The GM-Toyota Experience, 58 ANTITRUST
L.J. 709 (1989); Brad Begin, Note, The GM-Toyota Joint Venture: Legal Cooperation or Illegal
Combination in the World Automobile Industry?, 19 TEx. INT'L L.J. 699 (1984); Paul C. Cumin,
Note, United States Antitrust Law and Industrial Policy: International Joint Ventures and Global
Competition After GM-Toyota, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 257 (1986); Christopher J. Jaekels, Note,
International Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy: FTC Puts GM and Toyota in the Driver's Seat,
4 Wis. INT'L L.J. 64 (1985); Sean D. Murphy, Note, International Joint Ventures in the United
States: The GM-Toyota Deal, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 505 (1984).
60. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170 (1964).
61. General Motors, 103 F.T.C. at 386 (Miller, Comm'r).
62. See id. at 390 (Pertschuk, Comm'r, dissenting).
63. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.3, at 116-20; see also United States v. Container Corp.
of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969) (noting increased competitive risks posed by information exchanges
in concentrated markets); General Motors, 103 F.T.C. at 393 (Bailey, Comm'r, dissenting) (noting
that the market in which the GM-Toyota venture was to operate was "at best moderately
concentrated, and at worst highly concentrated.").
Recently, however, some courts have expressed the view that information exchanges are
worrisome only when accompanied by other evidence of price-fixing. See In re Coordinated
Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 447 n.13 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert denied, II1 S. Ct 2274 (1991).
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B. The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
Congress proposes to incorporate the Amendments into the framework
of the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (NCRA).64 The NCRA
was designed to encourage those types of joint ventures least likely to
threaten consumers, those devoted to research and product develop-
ment.65
1. The Economics of Cooperative Research
The Department of Justice (DOJ), the nation's chief antitrust
enforcement agency, has never brought suit against a research joint venture
unless it was simply a transparent scheme to divide markets. 66 Further,
the courts have strongly supported cooperative research arrangements
except when they contain unreasonable restraints on competition.67
The economic benefits of cooperative research arrangements chiefly
derive from the avoidance of free-rider problems. If a firm individually
develops a new technology, its competitors can cheaply duplicate its results
through reverse engineering, industrial espionage, or other means, without
bearing the same costs as the firm that performed the original research. 68
Joint ventures provide a mechanism for spreading the costs of the research
among those who will eventually benefit from the new developments, while
also effectively reducing free riding.69
Free-rider problems are not a characteristic of all economic activity or
of all research. Free riding will occur only where the item or knowledge
produced is a public good-a good which, after it has been produced, is
impossible to deny to any who would consume it.70 When those who do
not pay for the good cannot obtain it, free riding cannot occur. Because
free riders more readily appropriate the products of basic research, as
64. 15 U.S.C. §5 4301-4305 (1988).
65. See generally supra note 37 and accompanying text
66. DOJ RESEARCH JoINT VENTURE GUIDE, supra note 41, at 2.
67. But see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 299-304 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (research joint venture condemned for multi-firm agreement
not to disclose results to outsiders), cited in HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, § 4.3, at 114 n.13.
68. See HoVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.3.
69. Id. at 114.
70. SeeTHE MIT DICTIONARY O MODERN EcoNoMics 347-48 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed.
1986). Some commonly cited examples include public highways, national defense, and
lighthouses. A defining characteristic of, for example, toll roads and private security forces is that
they are not public goods, although they may otherwise be similar to public highways or national
armed forces.
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distinguished from applied research or product development, measures to
protect basic research will reduce free riding.71
Moreover, when cooperative research and development is permitted,
economic theory suggests that the total amount of research spending in the
economy will be greater than if firms must fund their research and
development (R&D) alone.72 Recognition of this principle has lead to the
creation of such successful ventures as MCC73 and Sematech.74
Supporters of cooperative research have also justified it with a second,
more dubious economic theory. This theory extends the arguments of
Joseph Schumpeter, an Austrian economist who believed that only large,
monopolistic firms could afford to undertake R&D.75  Schumpeter
believed that, because a purely competitive market drives economic profits
to zero, only firms able to insulate themselves from competition would
have any capital to fund large-scale R&D.76
71. See Barry Bozeman, Albert Link & Asghar Zardkoohi, An Economic Analysis of R & D
Joint Ventures, 7 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 263 (1986).
72. Id. at 265.
73. Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation.
74. For skeptical views of Sematech's relevance in improving the competitiveness of United
States firms vis-a-vis foreign firms, see ROBERT B. REiCH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING
OURSELVES FOR 21sT-CENrURY CAPITALISM 160-61 (1991); Richard Brandt, The Bad Boy of
Silicon Valley, Bus. WK., Dec, 9, 1991, at 64.
75. Schumpeter expressed this view as follows:
[T]here are superior methods available to the monopolist which either are not
available at all to a crowd of competitors or are not available to them so readily: for
there are advantages which, though not strictly unattainable on the competitive level
of enterprise, are as a matter of fact secured only on the monopoly level, for instance,
because monopolization may increase the sphere of influence of the better, and
decrease the sphere of influence of the inferior, brains, or because the monopoly
enjoys a disproportionately higher financial standing.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 101 (3d ed. 1950).
[Tlhe perfectly competitive arrangement displays wastes of its own. The firm of the
type that is compatible with perfect competition is in many cases inferior in internal,
especially technological, efficiency. If it is, then it wastes opportunities. It may also
in its endeavours to improve its methods of production waste capital because it is in
a less favorable position to evolve and to judge new possibilities.
Id. at 106. Schumpeterian theory and its role in the antitrust analysis of R&D joint ventures is
brilliantly analyzed in Daniel M. Crane, JointResearch and Development Ventures and the Antitrust
Laws, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 405, 416-18 (1984). A cogent discussion of the Schumpeterian
position is also available in 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15, 407.
76. See Crane, supra note 75, at 416. Some scholars have interpreted Schumpter's position
more sympathetically
Extensive though Schumpeter's criticisms of anti-monopoly policy may be, they do
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Whether viewed as a way to permit supposedly healthy monopolization
or simply a way to overcome the free-rider problems inherent in basic
research, the policy prescription for cooperative research remains the same.
Research joint ventures deserve encouragement and protection from
excessively harsh antitrust liability, which in turn will internalize the costs
of research in the firms which benefit therefrom and increase the total level
of research spending in the economy.
2. The Passage and Effects of the Act
Businesses had perceived some antitrust risk in forming research and
development joint ventures and refrained from doing so, contributing in
Congress' opinion to the United States growing trade deficit.77 By passing
the NCRA, 78 Congress primarily sought to reassure businesses that the
government viewed research and development joint ventures as beneficial
and would not oppose them with antitrust lawsuits. 79 The NCRA
provides several ways in which firms contemplating research and develop-
ment joint ventures can reduce their potential antitrust liability.
not presuppose that innovation is caused by monopoly power or large size. His
targets are those economists who regard perfect competition as the ideal form of
industrial organization; there are many such economists to this very day. And his
thesis.., is that the replacement of perfect competition by modem capitalism brings
both monopoly power and innovation; the two are quite inseparable, according to
Schumpeter. Reverting to perfect competition, on the other hand, which is the
natural goal of anti-monopoly policy, would only serve to prevent useful innovation.
Peter J. Hammond, Must Monopoly Power Accompany Innovation?, in LEcruREs oN ScHuaM-
PETERIAN ECONOMICS: SCHUMPETER CENTENARY MEMORIAL LECTURES, GRAz 1983, at 45, 50-51
(Christian Seidl ed., 1984). Schumpeter says either that monopoly is a necessary and sufficient
condition for innovation to occur, or monopoly is neither necessary nor sufficient for innovation,
but "modem capitalism" causes both monopoly and innovation. Either analysis yields the same
policy prescription: to foster innovation, it is necessary to weaken the antitrust laws.
77. See S. REP. No. 427, supra note 79; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1044, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3131, 3131.
78. Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. SS 4301-4305 (1988)).
79. S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3105,
3105-07. The NCRA was one of many measures Congress enacted in the early 1980s to foster
cooperative research. For an overview of recent federal efforts to encourage cooperative research,
see generally Dianne Rahm, Federal Efforts to Enhance U.S. International Competitiveness: The
Encouragement of Domestic Cooperation, 18 PoLY STUD. J. 89 (1989).
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(a) The Rule of Reason Standard
The heart of the Act, section 3, requires courts to judge any research
and development joint venture under the rule of reason standard rather
than the more rigid per se approach.80 The rule of reason requires the
court to consider and evaluate any procompetitive justifications a firm may
offer for its conduct.81 Therefore, all challenged joint ventures will have
an opportunity to offer justifications for their conduct, justifications which
section 3 of the NCRA requires the courts to seriously consider. According
to the statutes terms, this section applies in all cases and is not limited to
cases in which firms have completed a business notification filing.82
(b) Attorneys' Fees
Section 5 of the NCRA83 provides that the court shall award the costs
of the lawsuit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to "substantially
prevailing" plaintiffs in an antitrust challenge to a research and develop-
ment joint venture. 84 Courts may also award "substantially prevailing"
defendants their costs and attorneys' fees if the plaintiff's "claim, or...
conduct during the litigation . . . was frivolous, unreasonable, without
foundation, or in bad faith." 8.5 An award of costs and attorneys' fees to
the substantially prevailing party applies not only to challenges under
federal antitrust laws, but also to challenges brought under "any State law
similar to the [federal] antitrust laws."86 The award of costs and fees may
be offset, in whole or in part, if the substantially prevailing party is itself
guilty of any conduct "the court finds to be frivolous, unreasonable,
without foundation, or in bad faith." 87 As with section 3,88 section 5,
by its own terms, also applies in all cases and is not limited to cases in
which businesses have completed a notification filing.
80. 15 U.S.C. S 4302 (1988). 15 U.S.C. S 4301(a)(6) defines the term "joint research and
development venture." Section 4301(b) defines the term again by listing what it excludes.
81. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.4; SuL~ivAN, supra note 12, SS 63-67.
82. See infra part III.B.2.c.
83. 15 U.S.C. S 4304 (1988).
84. Id. S 4304(a)(1).
85. Id. S 4304(a)(2).
86. Id. S 4304(a).
87. Id. S 4304(b).
88. See supra part III.B.2.a.
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(c) Business Notification
The remainder of the NCRA, sections 4 and 6, establish a notification
system under which businesses can limit their liability by notifying federal
antitrust enforcement agencies of their plans to engage in a research and
development joint venture.89 The parties to the venture can submit a
statement to the DOJ and to the FTC identifying the parties to the joint
venture and the "nature and objectives" of the venture.90 The NCRA
prescribes no particular form or procedure for this notice; the parties retain
substantial discretion in deciding what information to include and how to
include it.91 Once the federal enforcement agencies receive the notice, one
of them must file a statement in the Federal Register within thirty days
which identifies the parties and describes the "area of planned activity" of
the venture.92 To protect the venture from unfair prying by competitors,
the published notice need only be "in general terms," 93 and the agencies'
notification files are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act.94
The popularity of the business notification system has increased in
recent years, with 95 notices filed in 1989, 123 in 1990, and 146 in 1991. 95
As a practical matter, the FTC plays no role in the notification process; the
DOJ publishes all notices in the Federal Register.96
A completed notification filing invokes the protections of section 4 of
the NCRA. 97 The most important protection conferred limits recoverabil-
ity to actual damages sustained in actions by the federal government, states,
or private parties in actions under federal or state antitrust laws, rather than
allowing the trebling of damages.98
Current United States law preserves the treble-damages principle
inherited from the seventeenth-century Statute of Monopolies, 99 which
89. Id. SS 4303, 4305.
90. Id. S 4305(a)(1)-(2).
91. Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, National Cooperative Research Act Implementation,
49 Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,122 (1984).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 4305(b) (1988).
93. Id.
94. Id. S 4305(d). The relevant section of the Freedom of Information Act is 5 U.S.C. 5 552
(1988).
95. Search of WESTLAW, FR file (Mar. 22, 1992). The author has made no attempt to
separate initial filings from those that merely amend an earlier filing.
96. Id.
97. 15 U.S.C. S 4305(c) (1988).
98. Id. S 4303(a)-(c).
99. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jam., ch. 3, S 4 (Eng.), microformed on The Statutes of
the Realm, Reel 3 (Trans-Media Publishing Co.).
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entitles successful antitrust plaintiffs to recover three times the amount of
their actual damages.100 Even the United States Government may recover
treble damages when it is "injured in its business or property" by an an-
titrust violation.1o1 While commentators have advanced various ratio-
nales for awarding victorious plaintiffs treble damages, the prevailing
interpretation states that treble damages reflect a one-in-three chance that
antitrust violations will be detected and successfully prosecuted.1o2
Because violators of antitrust laws may count on being held accountable for
their actions only one time in three, the theory goes, tripling violators'
liability serves to roughly equalize anticompetitive conduct and antitrust
liability. Filing under section 4 of the NCRA prevents damages from being
trebled, reducing by two-thirds the potential liability businesses face for
engaging in anticompetitive research and development joint ventures.
3. Criticisms of the Act
The government tends not to sue research and development joint
ventures, and, when others sue them, the courts treat them leniently.103
Therefore, what need could have existed for a legislative declaration for
lenient treatment of research and development joint ventures? The
legislative history suggests that, even though businesses faced no real risk of
liability, businesses believed that forming cooperative research ventures
actually threatened antitrust liability, and that this erroneous belief had a
sufficiently chilling effect on cooperative research to justify the passage of
the NCRA.10 4 Yet why should Congress' job include legislating away
businesses' groundless, irrational fears, forcing Congress to play "pan-
industrial psychologist" 1o5
100. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1988). See generally 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15, 331;
HOVWNKAMP, supra note 9, S 15.6; SULIVAN, supra note 12, S 246.
101. 15 U.S.C.A. S 15a (West Supp. 1991). Treble damages were not available in suits by
the government until 1990, but were added by the Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-588, S 5, 104 Stat. 2879 (1990). If the rationale for treble damages to compensate for
the difficulty of detecting antitrust violations, then it should make no difference to a defendant's
liability that the government, rather than a private party, uncovered the wrongful conduct.
102. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 15.6; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Treble Damages Reform,
33 ANTITRUST BULL. 233, 238 (1988).
103. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
104. S. REP. No. 427, supra note 79, at 2-3, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3106.
105. "Congress undertook the role of pan-industrial psychologist in response to nothing more
than perceptions that the 'antitrust laws' discouraged a form of commercial activity in a way
prejudicial to successful American participation in international trade." John A. Maher & Nancy
J. LaMont, National Cooperative Research Act of 1984: Cartelism for High-Tech Ventures (and
Others?), 7 DicK- J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1988) (footnote omitted). This perception has apparently
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Second, if Congress's concern about the United States lackluster
performance in the global economy 0 6 is genuine, it seems odd that they
did not limit NCRA benefits to domestic firms.107
Third, the rule of reason standard required in all antitrust cases
involving a research and development joint venture'08 does nothing to
reassure businesses that courts will uphold their cooperative research ac-
tivities against challenge. If anything, the reverse is true-per se rules deal
in certainties, while the rule of reason permits a court to weigh numerous
effects, some procompetitive and some anticompetitive. "If Congress
wanted to send a signal to encourage R&D joint ventures, codification of
the rule of reason probably does not send that signal."109
Fourth, the rule that "substantially prevailing" parties can recover their
costs and attorneys' fees satisfied no one. The NCRA provides no
definition of "substantially prevailing." Those politically disposed to favor
defendants in antitrust lawsuits oppose this extra incentive for plaintiffs to
bring suit."10 Conversely, those disposed to favor antitrust plaintiffs see
the possibility of plaintiffs being held liable for the costs and fees of
successful defendants as deterring meritorious suits along with frivolous
ones."'
Fifth, some view the business notification process as invasive and
dangerous, because publication of the notice will draw the attention of
lingered for some time without the luxury of any basis in fac. "The allegation that businessmen
feel discouraged goes to their state of mind and is obviously impossible to verify or to refute. On
the other hand, the known facts tend to refute any concrete assertion about the inhibitory effect
of the antitrust laws." Letter from Thomas E. Kauper, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't
of Justice, to Arch N. Booth 4 (Apr. 26, 1974), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 663, S F, at 1 (1974), quoted in Joelson & Griffin, supra note 22, at 489.
106. See S. REp. No. 427, supra note 79, at 1-4, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3105-08;
id. at 25, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3121 (Hatch, Laxalt, Simpson, East, and Denton, Sens.) ("An
increase in such [joint R&D] activity is necessary for the health of both our domestic economy
and our international trade. Those who engage in joint R&D activity are serving the Nation's best
interests."); id. at 29-31, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3124-26 (Biden, Sen.).
107. Maher & LaMont, supra note 105, at 4-5 (noting that the word "National" in the name
of the NCRA is a misnomer since it "signifies neither that NCRA encourages only domestic
'cooperative research' nor that benefitted cooperators need be American nor that benefits of such
research will be peculiar to American enterprises nor that there will be value to the American
economy as distinguished from a world economy.").
108. See supra part III.B.2.a.
109. David L. Foster, Gregory L. Curtner & Elizabeth C. Dell, The National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984 as a Shield from the Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. & CoM. 347, 354 (1985); see also
id. at 355-61, 364-65.
110. S. RP. No. 427, supra note 79, at 25-26, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3121-22
(Hatch, Laxalt, Simpson, East, and Denton, Sens.); id. at 27-28, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3123 (Dole,
Sen.).
111. Id. at 32-34, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3126-28 (Metzenbaum, Sen.).
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potential competitors who might otherwise not have known of the venture's
existence.' 12 Those fearful of governmental intrusion into their affairs
greet skeptically the NCRA's invitation to voluntarily send the government
information on their business plans." 3
Sixth, even if the notification procedures are complied with, "detre-
bling" of damages is a perverse remedy. In effect, the NCRA attempts to
encourage lawful conduct by decreasing the penalties for unlawful
conduct.114 The threat of treble damages should remain as a deterrent
against anticompetitive conduct unless its supporting rationale no longer
applies. One argument against treble damages might suggest that because
the notification system raises the odds of detecting an antitrust violation
above one in three, treble damages are no longer necessary to equalize
antitrust liability with anticompetitive conduct. Nevertheless, using the
NCRA notification scheme to justify "detrebling" of damages has two flaws.
First, the character of the notice, describing in general terms the "nature
and objectives" of a venture, leaves the parties substantial discretion to
decide what to include, and does not aid in detecting antitrust viola-
tions.1 5 Second, only the government has full access to what little
information the parties must provide. An injured private party would
probably be much more willing to press an antitrust suit against its antago-
nist,1 6 especially considering the ponderous process the government
follows in deciding whether to sue." 7 These private parties, who might
have the greatest incentive to challenge a harmful venture, have only the
government's published notice of the venture "in general terms" and
cannot compel the release of further information from the government's
files."s The original rationale for treble damages-that the difficulty in
detecting antitrust violations justifies disproportionate punishment when
they are detected-remains intact, further undermining the rationale of the
"detrebling" function of the NCRA.
112. Foster, Curtner & Dell, supra note 109, at 355 ("[I]t is not clear that venturers will
conclude that [notification filing's] potential as a shield from treble damages outweighs the
potential harms of filing.").
113. See id. at 355 n.49.
114. Id. at 361-62; see also id. at 362 ("Granting protections to law violators may in practice,
however, serve to benefit not those joint venturers who inadvertently engage in anticompetitive
activity, but those who consciously decide to break the law and take the potential of single
damages into account as a cost of doing business.").
115. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
116. For example, the GM-Toyota joint venture upheld by the FTC in 1984, see supra notes
59-63 and accompanying text, had to be narrowed somewhat because of a suit brought by
Chrysler. See Chrysler Settles Suit over Link of GM, Toyota, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 1985, at 2.
117. See infra part III.C.
118. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
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The seventh and perhaps best argument against the NCRA is its
irrelevancy. While the NCRA might have substantially modified some areas
of antitrust law," 9 it has never perceptibly influenced the antitrust
treatment of R&D joint ventures. No court has cited the NCRA to support
the purpose for which it was enacted,120 and no courts have ever cited
the heart of the NCRA, section 3, for any reason at all. Nearly a decade has
passed since the ostensibly urgent passage of the NCRA, and the world still
awaits its first substantive application to any case.
C. The Department of Justice's 1988 Antitrust Guidelines for International
Operations
In 1988, the DOJ issued its Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations.' 2 ' The Guidelines denote the DOJ's official
position and describe the circumstances under which it will or will not
bring an antitrust lawsuit against an international business arrangement.
The DOJ has had decidedly mixed success with its efforts to promul-
gate Guidelines in the recent past, earning criticism from Congress and
commentators, and indifference from the courts. Because the 1985 Vertical
Restraints Guidelines diverged so sharply from settled law, Congress
vigorously condemned them by saying the guidelines "do not have the force
of law, do not accurately state current antitrust law, and should not be
considered by the Courts of the United States as binding or persuasive, and
should be recalled by the Attorney General."122 Even commentators
sympathetic to the DOrs position conceded that
119. See Maher & LaMont, supra note 105, at 3-4, 13-24 (1988) (arguing that the NCRA
extends the rule of reason into new areas of antitrust jurisprudence).
120. See California v. ARC An. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 n.5 (1989) (citing S 4303(c) of the
NCRA as an example of a federal statute preempting comparable state laws); United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 675 F. Supp. 655, 662 n.30 (D.D.C. 1987) (analogizing from the NCRA to
define the word "manufacture"). Courts have also cited the NCRA twice for its provisions
involving attorneys' fees and twice for its provisions involving sanctions. See Marek v. Chesny, 473
U.S. 1, 46 (attorneys' fees); United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d
408, 412 n.2 (2d Cir. 1989) (attorneys' fees); Coghlan v. Starkey, 852 F.2d 806, 817 n.21 (5th Cir.
1988) (sanctions); Farguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 360 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986)
(sanctions). All of the above cases cite the NCRA in dicta; no part of the NCRA has ever
provided the rule of decision on which any court has based its holding.
121. ANTITRUST DivisioN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1988), reprinted in 16 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGULATION app. 3 (1991), and in 55 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391 (Nov. 17, 1988), and in WORLD COMPETITION L & EcON.
REv., Mar. 1989, at 105.
122. H.R. REP. No. 399, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1985).
TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
[t]he overwhelming impression created by the DOJ vertical
merger Guidelines is that the DOJ does not intend to waste much
time chasing vertical mergers. The "theories" to which it gives
the most attention are really nontheories, never used by courts
before and sometimes not even well developed in academic
literature. Established judicial theories of vertical mergers are all
but forgotten. ... [M]ost of the factual predicates for the new
theories are so implausible that they will seldom or never oc-
cur.23
The "nontheories" of the DOJ's 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines
received a tepid response from commentators124 and courts. The Tenth
Circuit declined to apply the Guidelines in an important merger case,
remarking that the Guidelines "are more useful for setting prosecutorial
policy than delineating judicial standards."'125 The United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by then-Judge Clarence
Thomas, noted that the Government's presentation of its market share data
under the auspices of the Merger Guidelines could not alone establish the
Government's case.' 26
The DOJ's initial draft of its 1988 Guidelines also bore little resem-
blance to existing law. After harsh criticism by the American Bar Associa-
tion, the DOJ changed the 1988 Guidelines to bring them marginally more
in line with current precedent.127 The DOJ concedes that its 1988 Guide-
lines do not accurately state existing law, but contends that they are still
valuable since they provide businesses with notice of the DOJ's international
enforcement posture. 28 Consequently, the Guidelines are of little use to
attorneys advising clients who wish to undertake an international business
transaction, since private plaintiffs, state attorneys general, or the FTC
123. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 7.4, at 212-13.
124. Two FTC employees found no empirical support for the Merger Guidelines' use of
particular values of the Herfindahl-Herschman Index to establish presumptions of market
concentration or deconcentration. See Noel D. Uri & Malcolm B. Coate, The Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines: The Search for Empirical Support; 7 IrN'L REv. L & EcoN. 113 (1987);
see also Louis B. Schwartz, The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and
Private Counseling or Propaganda for Revision ofthe Antitrust Laws?, 71 CAL. L. Rv. 575 (1983).
125. Monfort of Colo., Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 579 (10th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 479 U.S. 104 (1986); accord Prater v. United States Parole Comm'n, 802 F.2d 948, 954
(7th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("[I]fthe Justice Department issues guidelines for the enforcement of
a federal statute that it administers (as it did in the 1984 Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, for example), this is the performance of an interpretive function that every law
enforcement agency has; it is not the enactment of a law.") (Posner, J.).
126. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
127. See generally Fugate, supra note 27.
128. See id. at 297-98.
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might successfully bring suit against transactions the DOJ has stated it will
ignore.' 29 Despite these shortcomings, the Guidelines contain helpful
statements describing the DOJ's approach in evaluating a transnational joint
venture. The remote chance that the DOJ will ever bring suit diminishes
whatever potential liability that remains for transnational joint ventures
after the NCRA.
The DOJ conducts a three-step evaluation of transnational joint
ventures, invoking a possible fourth step only if the first three steps have
revealed sufficient anticompetitive potential. The first step measures the
effect of the joint venture in the relevant operational market. The test is
a simple one: "if the participating firms would have been allowed to merge
outright" under the DOJ's highly permissive merger analysis, the DOJ
automatically approves the venture and the analysis ends.130
If the DOJ would have challenged the merger, the analysis proceeds to
the second step. At this stage the inquiry turns to the effect of the venture
in "spillover markets, those not the immediate subject of the agreement but
ones in which the parties are actual or potential competitors and which
might conceivably be affected by the transaction."'13
If the second stage of the investigation reveals an effect in spillover
markets, the investigators proceed to the third part of the test. The third
stage of the analysis examines any resulting vertical restraints, other than
vertical price restrictions. 1 -32  Again, "[g]iven the [DOJ's] generally
positive attitude towards vertical non-price restraints, this step will rarely
129. Donald I. Baker & Bennett Rushkoff, The 1988 Justice Department International
Guidelines: Searching for Legal Standards and Reassurance, 23 COmELL INT'L L.J. 405, 406 (1990);
James . Atwood & Charles Lister, International Antitrust Enforcement in the George Bush
Administration: The Enforcement Guidelines and Beyond, WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV.,
Mar. 1989, at 5; Robert G. Shimp, Comment, A Critical Review of the justice Department's 1988
Antitrust Guidelines for International Operations, 14 N.C. J. INT'L L & CoM. REG. 287, 289-90
(1989).
The DOJ and the FTC could eliminate some of the uncertainty inherent in the present
International Guidelines if they jointly issued a new set of guidelines, reassuring businesses
planning a venture that neither federal antitrust agency would challenge conduct within the
guidelines' limits. The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines recently issued by the DOJ and FTC
provide some hope that future joint guidelines may be forthcoming. See Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg.
41,552 (1992), reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1559 (spec. supp. Apr. 2,
1992), and in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (May 5, 1992).
130. Baker & Rushkoff, supra note 129, app. a at 430; see also Atwood & Lister, supra note
129, at 20.
131. Atwood & Lister, supra note 129, at 20-21.
132. As to the law and economics of vertical restraints generally, see HOVENKAMP, supra note9, 99 9.1-9.4.
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present a problem."133
If and only if the first three steps have identified anticompetitive effects
associated with a venture, the analysis proceeds to the fourth step which
allows an examination of any procompetitive efficiencies that may offset the
harms of the venture. As a matter of law, courts have generally been
unreceptive to an "efficiency defense,"1 34 but the DOJ apparently will not
wait for the courts to permit the efficiency defense. Therefore, the
Guidelines incorporate the defense as a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
Under the Guidelines, few transnational joint ventures, no matter how
anticompetitive their effects, face any real risk of prosecution by the DOJ.
In a way, the DOJ has already accomplished exactly what the National
Cooperative Production Amendments hope to achieve-a lessening of any
antitrust barriers to joint ventures although the effect indisputably
eliminates competition.
IV. THE PROPOSED NATIONAL COOPERATIVE
PRODUCTION AMENDMENTS
A. The Positions of the Administration and Congress
1. The Executive Branch
The last two administrations have expressed rather different opinions
on the desirability of the Amendments. Reagan Administration officials
assured Congress at the time of the NCRA's passage that the government
would not use the NCRA as a basis for any further weakening of the
nation's antitrust laws.135 Nevertheless, the Bush Administration's
antitrust enforcers said that the NCRA would provide a good framework
133. Atwood & Lister, supra note 129, at 21 (footnote omitted).
134. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 11.2; Fugate, supra note 27, at 328 & n.258. "Possible
economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality." FTC v. Procter & Gamble Corp., 386 U.S.
568, 580 (1966).
135. At the time the NCRA was passed, the chief of the Antitrust Division wrote to Sen.
Howard Metzenbaum and stated that "I am writing to assure you that I do not view the passage
of S. 1841 [the Senate NCRA bill] ... to be a precedent for any future measure designed to
reduce the treble damage antitrust remedy as it applies to any other type of conduct." Letter
from J. Paul McGrath, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Sen. Howard M.
Metzenbaum, July 30, 1984, reprinted in 130 CONG. REc. S9519 (July 31, 1984), quoted in Foster,
Curtner & Dell, supra note 109, at 370 n.119. "Both Congress and the Justice Department
emphasized that the [National Cooperative Research] Act would not be a precedent for future
revisions or exemptions in the antitrust laws." Foster, Curtner & Dell, supra note 109, at 370
(footnote omitted).
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for easing any antitrust burden on production joint ventures. 136 Other
Bush Administration officials led the charge for the passage of the Amend-
ments.' 37  Echoing justifications offered for the NCRA, 138 the Bush
Administration insisted that the uncertain legality of cooperative production
ventures confuses businesses, resulting in a chilling effect that undermines
United States competitiveness. 39
In fact, the Bush Administration elevated the Amendments to the level
of foreign policy. In its recent Structural Impediments Initiative with
Japan, the government made a commitment to reduce the antitrust
penalties for transnational production joint ventures. 40 Although that
commitment was made during 1990, the Bush Administration never
succeeded in passing a cooperative production bill through Congress.' 4'
136. Production Joint Ventures-Antitrust Division Views; 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,024
(1989).
137. The Secretary of Commerce and the Attorney General sent an early version of the
Amendments to Congress in early 1991. Administration Transmits Legislation on Limited
Immunity for Joint Ventures, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcUTIvEs, Apr. 30, 1991, at A-9, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Drexec File. In keeping with the Department of Commerce's general
uneasiness with antitrust enforcement, see supra note 3, it seems appropriate that one of the most
vocal advocates of the Amendments is a Commerce Department attorney. See Alden F. Abbott,
Joint Production Ventures: The Case for Antitrust Reform, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 715 (1989).
138. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
139. Bush Administration UnveilsProposal to Encourage Production Joint Ventures, DAILY REP.
FOR ExEcUTIvES, May 9, 1990, at A-13, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Drexec File.
140. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural Impediments Initiative: An Example ofBilateral Trade
Negotiation, 12 MICH. J. Ier'L L. 436, 444 (1991); Lanneaux, supra note 3, at 250-51; Key
Elements of U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative Joint Report Released by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcTrrIvEs, June 29, 1990, at M-8, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Drexec File.
141. Some attributed this failing to the Administration's poor performance in finding Senate
cosponsors for the legislation. Sherry R. Sontag, The Look-Alike Antitrust Bills, NAT'L LJ., May
21, 1990, at 21.
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2. The Legislative Branch
Six versions of the Amendments have been introduced since 1990, but
none has yet emerged from Congress. 142 These bills differed from each
other primarily in technical detail, but the Administration's antitrust
enforcers have described them as substantially identical.14 3 The Amend-
ments have fared noticeably better in the House of Representatives than in
the Senate. The House passed one version of the Amendments in
1990,'4 but corresponding Senate bills have never emerged from the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 45
B. What the National Cooperative Production Amendments Would Do
The core of the Amendments would extend all NCRA provisions to
production, but not marketing, joint ventures.146 The Amendments
themselves, however, contain a few interesting variances from the NCRA.
First, Congress has apparently acknowledged the criticism that the NCRA
did nothing to help United States firms compete because its protections
extended to domestic and foreign firms alike.' 47 The House bill provides
that
142. S. 940, supra note 6, SS 401-402; S. 1163, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), microformed on
Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.411:102-1-187 (U.S. Govt Printing Office); H.R. 1604, supra note 6; H.L
4611, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CoNG. REc. H3099 (daily ed. June 5, 1990), microformed on Sup.
Docs. No. Y 1.4/6:101-110 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office); S. 2692, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
microformed on Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.4/1:101-124 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office); S. 2765, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. S 401 (1990), microforned on Sup. Docs. No. Y 1.4/1:101-156 (U.S. Gov't Printing
Office).
143. Rill Urges Senate Judiciary to Approve Bill Permitting Joint Production Ventures, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, July 18, 1990, at A-16, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Drexec File.
144. H.R. 4611, supra note 142.
145. The Senate Judiciary Committee has long served as a final resting place for bad
legislation, as one contemporary of the author of the Sherman Act noted:
I never have a bill in which I feel any interest referred to this mausoleum of
Senatorial literature, the Judiciary Committee, without feeling that I have attended
a funeral.... [Tihe country has found out that when we desire the death of a bill
and are not particularly anxious to put ourselves on record as having directly struck
the blow which caused the demise, we refer it to the Judiciary Committee, where it
sleeps the last sleep known to the literature of the Senate.
21 CoNG. REc. 2610 (1890) (Vance, Sen.), quoted in 2 WINFIELD S. KERR, JOHN SHERMAN: His
LIF N D PUBLIC SERVICES 203-04 (1908).
146. S. 940, supra note 6, S 402(b); H.R. 1604, supra note 6, S 2(b).
147. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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[t]he amendments to [the NCRA] made by the National Cooper-
ative Production Amendments of 1991 shall not apply with
respect to any activity in connection with the production of a
product, process, or service by a joint venture if at any time more
than 30 percen, in the aggregate, of the beneficial ownership of
the voting securities and equity of such joint venture is controlled
by foreign entities. Any facilities operated by such joint venture
shall be located within the United States or its territories.148
The corresponding portion of the Senate bill provides that
[t]he amendments to [the NCRA] made by the National Cooper-
ative Production Amendments of 1991 shall not apply with
respect to any activity in connection with the production of a
product, process, or service by a joint venture if at any time
substantially all such activities are not conducted within the United
States or its territories.' 49
Problems exist in both versions of the bill. The House and Senate
versions both deny their protections to joint ventures that conduct activities
abroad-the House version would require all production facilities of the
joint venture to be located in the United States, while the Senate version
would require only "substantially all" of the joint ventures production
facilities to be located in the United States. The Senate bill does not define
"substantially all," and the House bill places a cap of thirty percent on
foreign ownership or control of the venture. Consequently, if a United
States corporation enters into a production joint venture with a Japanese
corporation, a fifty-fifty ownership stake for each parent violates the House
version of the Amendments, but the Senate version permits this division'.
To avoid the problem altogether, the parties could arrange alternative
capital structures for the venture, reducing the foreign parent's participation
to any statutory maximum while effectuating the parties' intent in creating
the joint venture.'5 0 Under either bill, however, the venture could not
operate entirely in Japan. If the venture operated ninety-nine production
facilities in the United States and one in Japan, the House version of the
bill would still not protect it, although this arrangement should meet the
Senate bill's "substantially all" requirement.
Neither bill applies any of these restrictions to research and devel-
148. H.R. 1604, supra note 6, S 2(0 (emphasis added).
149. S. 940, supra note 6, S 402(0 (emphasis added).
150. Any detailed discussion of transnational venture capital or financing arrangements is
outside the scope of this Note.
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opment joint ventures; both speak only of the extensions to the NCRA to
cover production joint ventures. The NCRA, then, is subject to the same
criticism now as before, that its protections should not be available to
foreign businesses if Congress intends to give United States firms a
competitive advantage.' 51
Second, the Amendments would require a court, in evaluating a
challenge to a production joint venture, to consider potential competition
worldwide in assessing the joint ventures effect within the relevant market.
Measuring the ventures effect in commerce requires defining the relevant
market, ordinarily a two-step process which must define both a product
market and a geographic market.152 The Amendments would reduce that
analysis to one step, since the statute would define the relevant geographic
market as global.153 Obviously any firm will appear to have much less
market power if it is measured against every competitor in the world rather
than just those within a smaller area. A global market comparison will
reduce the apparent market power of production joint ventures in the
market in which they will operate, which increases the chances that the
venture will receive approval under the first step of the DOJ's analysis.54
C. Why the National Cooperative Production Amendments Should Fail
While collaboration among competitors at the level of abstract research
may pose little threat to consumers, in some markets the anticompetitive
risks of production joint ventures have already materialized in the form of
global cartelization. 55  The oligopolies dominating the petroleum,
automobile, and airline industries in the United States owe much of their
strength to the competition-insulating effect of multiple interlocking
transnational production joint ventures. 56 Production joint ventures
seem at first blush inherently more dangerous than research and develop-
ment joint ventures. Therefore, to compensate for the seemingly greater
risks from a production joint venture, the Amendments' proponents could
justify equal treatment for these two classes of ventures only if the
justifications for production joint ventures were even stronger than those
advanced for research and development joint ventures.157
151. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
152. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, SS 3.1-3.6; 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 15, ch. 5C.
153. S. 940, supra note 6, S 402(d); H.R 1604, supra note 6, S 2(d).
154. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
156. See Adams & Brock, supra note 3, at 438-81.
157. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
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None of the justifications supporting the NCRA applies to production
joint ventures. NCRA supporters argued that research joint ventures were
needed to keep competitors from appropriating the results of expensive
research projects, eliminating the free-rider effect.'58  However, it is
difficult to imagine a parallel effect in production that needs eliminating.
As previously noted, free riding can only occur with public goods, goods
which cannot be kept from any consumer once they are produced,15 9 and
which government usually provides. 160 Production joint ventures are
only necessary to the extent that government fails to provide some public
good, a necessity never discussed, much less proved, in literature supporting
the Amendments.' 61
Some believe economist Joseph Schumpeter's work supports the
NCRA, in particular, Schumpeter's opinion that only monopolistic firms
could generate sufficient profit to fund research projects.162  First,
Schumpeter's position is incorrect-monopolies do not do more or better
research.163 But even if Schumpeter's thesis is accepted, he never con-
tended that only monopolies are capable of producing a product efficiently.
Schumpeterian analysis, regardless of whether it justifies cooperative
research, does not address cooperative production, and therefore cannot be
invoked to support the Amendments.
1. Facilitating Cartelization
A basic tenet of contemporary antitrust theory states that high levels
of domestic concentration pose little threat to consumers, because competi-
tion from foreign firms will defeat any attempt by a domestic monopolist
158. HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 4.3; see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
160. CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 93-94 (10th ed. 1987).
161. See, e.g., Abbott, supra note 137.
162. See supra note 70.
163. "[C]ontrary to much of the conventional wisdom, innovative activity is apparently
hindered, not promoted, in concentrated markets .... [I]n fact, small firms tend to have the
innovative advantage in industries consisting of predominantly large firms." ZOLTAN J. ACS &
DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL FIRMS 147 (1990); see also Wesley M. Cohen,
Richard C. Levin & David C. Mowery, Firm Size and R&D Intensity: A Re-Examination, 35 J.
INDUs. ECON. 543 (1987); cf Crane, supra note 75, at 416-18. Even Schumpetees defenders
acknowledge an advantage for smaller firms. "The reason why monopolies usually find innovation
easier is that they have no free riders to deal with; where the free rider problem is overcome by
suitable industry-wide cooperation, a competitive industry benefits just as much as a monopoly,
and in fact somewhat more." Hammond, supra note 76, at 55-56 (citing Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (1962)).
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to increase prices.164 If domestic firms freely engage in transnational
production joint ventures, though, two anticompetitive effects result. First,
the potential competition between the domestic firm and the foreign firm
in the joint ventures market shrinks. Second, and equally problematic, is
the ability of the domestic venturer to decrease the competitive pressure the
foreign venturer might have brought to bear against cartelization of the
domestic firm's market. When foreign competition no longer provides an
effective check on intra-national cartelization, high levels of domestic con-
centration once again become worrisome. 165 The supporting literature
of the Amendments has yet to seriously address these dual risks of inter-
and intra-national cartelization.
2. Reducing Product Differentiation
Consumers benefit from having a wide' range of different products
available for purchase.166 When many firms independently produce
many products, substantial product differentiation can occur even if the
firms start from the same basic research.167 When competing firms form
a production joint venture, however, the venture may lack the means or the
incentive to produce as many varieties of products as its parent firms would
if they had remained in competition. Production joint ventures threaten
to harm consumers by reducing product differentiation-a threat which
164. "Effective foreign competition serves as a more expedient and efficient check on
competitive abuses by domestic firms than U.S. antitrust enforcers can ever hope to be." Inter-
nationalization of Antitrust-Antitrust Division Chiefs Views, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,019,
at 48,588 (May 16, 1989). The idea that foreign firms limit the conduct of domestic ones can be
traced at least back to Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Alcoa. See United States v. Aluminum
Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945) ("It is entirely consistent with the evidence that it
was the threat of greater foreign imports which kept 'Alcoa's' prices where they were, and
prevented it from exploiting its advantage as sole domestic producer[.]").
165. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROcK, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS ON TRIAL: A
DIALOGUE ON THE NEw LAISSEz-FAIRE 56-61 (1991). A comparative statistical study of the
United States and France found that French firms were exposed to three times the intensity of
foreign competition with which United States firms had to contend. William J. Adams, Does
Exposure to International Trade Justify Relaxed Antitrust Treatment of Mergers?, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L
& Bus. 589, 591 (1989). "It is precisely because so many American producers are naturally or
artificially protected from competition through international trade that vigor must be restored to
United States regulation of mergers." Id. at 593-94.
166. See McCoNNELL, supra note 160, at 603-04. As to the implications of product
differentiation for antitrust policy, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, S 11.6, at 307-08.
167. See Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Research Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis,
2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 315, 327 (1986) ("A competitive product market can coexist with a highly
concentrated research market.").
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research joint ventures do not pose. 168
3. Slowing Development of New Products
A final concern involves the ability of production joint ventures to
slow the pace of product development. Competing firms have an obvious
incentive to introduce new and better products before their competitors
introduce innovations of their own. Production joint ventures provide an
ideal vehicle for firms which wish to slow the pace of innovation, because
the participants in the venture can delay the release of new products
without fear that their co-venturers will beat them to market with a
profitable new release. Consequently, firms in a production joint venture
can enjoy the revenues from their most profitable product lines without
incurring high, continuous product development costs, while depriving
consumers of the new products which would be produced in the ventures
absence. 169
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NATIONAL COOPERATIVE
PRODUCTION AMENDMENTS
In their present form, the Amendments exchange a high likelihood of
harm to consumers for a speculative, unsubstantiated perception of
enhanced competitiveness of United States industries in the world economy.
Consumers certainly would not benefit from such an exchange. They face
the disheartening prospect of paying higher prices for a reduced selection
of products and slower innovation. In the short term, businesses forming
production joint ventures would benefit by effectively acquiring increased
market power, leading to higher profits. In the long term, however,
competition from firms not parties to the joint venture might undercut it,
reducing the benefits to the venturers. 70 In light of these concerns,
some alternatives to the Amendments should be considered.
168. Id. at 334.
169. Id.; see United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal.
1969), affd sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
170. A joint venture substantially identical to a cartel might prevent this long-term scenario
by raising entry barriers to keep competitors from the market.
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A. Do Nothing
Given the harmful effects of the Amendments, perhaps Congress
should choose the wisest course and leave the law as it currently stands.
First, the NCRA has thus far proved to be essentially irrelevant, 171 and
there is scant cause to believe that extending its coverage will extend its
impact. Second, the Supreme Court interprets the antitrust laws of the
United States to allow conduct which benefits consumers even though the
conduct involves otherwise suspect behavior.172 Existing law legitimizes
pro-consumer production joint ventures.' 73  Businesses that wish to
undertake a venture beneficial to consumers need no new assurances; those
that wish to undertake a venture harmful to consumers deserve none.
Unfortunately, complete inaction violates the United States diplomatic
pledge to Japan to reform United States production joint venture law,174
and even if that was ill-advised it was nonetheless made. The forces of
legislative inertia may also be at work. The introduction of so many
substantially similar bills in each recent session of Congress might indicate
that it is too late to prevent some legislating.'"5
B. Establish Per Se Rules
If Congress is serious about reducing the alleged uncertainty of
businesses regarding production joint ventures, it should forgo codifying the
rule of reason. The rule of reason requires only that courts balance the pro-
and anti-competitive effects of a challenged transaction and decide which
effects predominate.176 This approach certainly provides little ex ante
reassurance to businesses that wish to know whether they can safely enter
into a planned venture. 177 Rather than leaving courts with a balancing
test, Congress can reduce uncertainty simply by deciding what it does and
does not like about production joint ventures. A new statute might make
all joint ventures between companies not competing against each other in
171. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
173. Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint
Ventures, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1990, at 113, 124 (concluding that "the rule of reason would
be amply permissive towards U.S. [production] joint ventures.").
174. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
176. See SuuLivAN, supra note 12, SS 63-65.
177. This same argument has been made with equal relevance in opposition to the NCRA.
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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any line of commerce per se legal or might make joint ventures between
competitors holding more than a specified market share per se illegal.
Congress can draw the firm lines businesses claim to want, encouraging
those production joint ventures favorable to consumers while clearly
proscribing those harmful to consumers. Ideally, businesses provided with
such firm rules could then determine the legality of a proposed venture
before committing any assets to it. The general public would also benefit
by having the policy debate localized in a politically responsive branch of
government.
Unfortunately, this proposal requires a depth of economic sophistica-
tion Congress has yet to demonstrate. 178 It is doubtful that a meaningful
Congressional debate, detailing precisely which economic effects of a joint
venture merit protection and which merit condemnation, can occur in the
real world of partisan rivalry and lobbying by wealthy interest groups.
C. Adopt the European Community's Approach
A third possible solution, and one which may overcome the defects of
the previous two, is to adopt some form of the "exemption" process
currently practiced in the European Community (EC). The procedural
mechanism for such a process already exists in the United States in two
forms: the business notification procedure of the NCRA 179 and the
DOJ's business review letter program. Regulators would only need to
import the substantive analysis the EC applies to joint ventures.
The EC evaluates joint ventures under two primary laws: Article 85
of the Treaty of Rome30 and the EC's new merger control regula-
tion.18' United States regulators could dispose of the merger control
regulation fairly easily since it applies only to joint ventures falling within
a fairly narrow set of criteria: the venture must involve very large firms,
those whose annual global "aggregate turnover"18 2 exceeds approximately
178. "Congress is rarely inclined, and probably rarely equipped, to specify detailed standards
for competitive analysis in statutory language." Edward Correia, Congress and Antitrust Policy
After the Reagan Administration, in REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY 451, 454
(Harry First, Eleanor M. Fox & Robert Pitofsky eds., 1991).
179. See supra part III.B.2.c.
180. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CoMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art 85.
181. Commission Regulation 4064/89, 1990 O.J. (L 257) 13 [hereinafter Merger Control
Regulation].
182. This term essentially means "sales." See Otto Sandrock & Elke van Arnheim, New
Merger Control Rules in the EEB 25 I, r'L LAW. 859, 864 n.25 (1991). "Turnover" is the sum
of the amount of goods sold and services provided in a firm's ordinary course of business, minus
sales rebates, value-added taxes, and some other taxes. Alternate valuations, such as a fixed
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$7 billion and whose annual "aggregate turnover" within the EC exceeds
approximately $350 million.183 Only the very largest ventures will meet
this regulatory threshold.'8 4 The EC regulations exclude even those
ventures that meet the aggregate turnover requirements if the purpose or
effect of the venture is "the coordination of the competitive behavior of
[firms] which remain independent."185  On the other hand, ventures
"performing ...all the functions of an autonomous economic entity"
remain within the terms of the regulation.1 86 The applicability of the
regulation thus turns on the degree of integration the venturers under-
take-the closer their conduct resembles a merger, the more likely the EC's
merger control regulation will apply. Enforcement officials may still
analyze joint ventures not meeting the fairly high threshold for applicability
of the merger control regulation under Article 85,187 an analysis which
United States policymakers should consider. In particular, Article 85 details
a process which exempts joint ventures from regulation after the venture
meets certain requirements, 88 in effect establishing a rule of per se
legality for ventures satisfying its conditions. To qualify for exemption
percentage of total assets, can be used in some circumstances. Merger Control Regulation, supra
note 181, art. 5. For efforts to explain the turnover concept, see Joel Davidow, Competition
Policy, Merger Control and the European Community's 1992 Program, 29 COLUM. J. TRANsNAT'L
L. 11, 28-29 & n.92 (1991); Christopher Jones, The Scope of Application of the Merger Control
Regulation, 14 FORHAM INTL' L.J. 359, 362-64 (1990-1991).
183. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 181, art 1. The financial figures must be
measured in European Currency Units (ECUs), for which the global and EC aggregate turnover
requirements are 5 billion and 250 million, respectively.
184. Sandrock and von Arnheim estimate that "forty to sixty merger operations per year will
meet the Regulation's threshold of 5,000 million ECU." Sandrock & von Arnheim, supra note
182, at 865. The number of joint ventures of sufficient size to come under the Regulation may
be even fewer. However, the thresholds are expected to be lowered in 1993 "to an aggregate
turnover of 2,000 million ECU and to a Community-wide turnover over 100 million ECU." Id.
185. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 181, art. 3.
186. Id.
187. Sandrock & van Arnheim, supra note 182, at 867-68. Each of the EC member nations'
domestic competition laws will still apply to ventures outside the scope of the merger control
regulation. Id. at 873.
188. EEC TREATY art. 85, 3; RobertW. Kuhn, Recent Development, Emerging International
Antitrust Perspectives on Research and Development Joint Ventures, 16 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
1181, 1200-04 (1984). While Kuhn's discussion focuses on R&D joint ventures, nothing in his
analysis necessarily precludes extending Article 85 principles to production joint ventures, just as
the Amendments seek to build on the principles of the NCRA.
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under Article 85, the venture must demonstrate
1. that it "contributes to the improvement of the production or
distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or
economic progress";
2. that consumers receive an "equitable" share of the resulting
benefit;
3. that it does not impose greater restrictions on the venturers
than are necessary to accomplish the ventures objectives; and
4. that it does not increase the power of the venturers to
"eliminat[e] competition in respect of a substantial portion"
of the products in question. 8 9
These requirements mesh well with the policy objectives of the NCRA
and the Amendments. A stated desire for technological progress fuels both
the NCRA and the Amendments. A production joint venture truly
contributing to such progress should pass muster far more easily than a
venture designed merely for short-term exploitation of consumers, yet the
text of the Amendments does not require joint venturers to demonstrate
benefits expected to flow from the venture. 190 Adopting a measure
analogous to the first prong of the Article 85 test would ensure that only
those truly procompetitive ventures receive antitrust exemptions from
Congress. Similar arguments can be made for each of the other prongs of
the Article 85 test. In this manner, Article 85 provides businesses with the
certainty the rule of reason approach cannot, exempting ventures which
satisfy the Article 85 tests.191
The United States could implement legislation codifying some variant
on the EC's Article 85 tests using either of two procedures already in place.
First, the DOJ could expand the business notification procedure of the
NCRA192 to include evaluation of the venture's adherence to Article 85
189. EEC TREATY art. 85, 3.
190. This approach would, in effect, establish a rebuttable presumption of illegality, with the
burden on the joint venturers to demonstrate the benefits their alliance would produce. Other
commentators have suggested similar antitrust presumptions against oiher types of potentially
harmful business activity. See John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the
Jurisprudence of Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the
Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125, 1148-50 (1987).
191. See EEC TREATY art. 85.
192. See supra part III.B.2.c.
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principles. After determining that a venture satisfies the statutory
requirements, the DOJ could then give those ventures whatever degree of
antitrust exemption Congress might choose, from "detrebling" of damages
to outright immunity from liability from suits brought by private parties.
Second, the DOJ currently issues business review letters to parties seeking
its opinion on a planned business transaction. These letters sometimes
include the DOJ's position regarding whether, given the facts the parties
supply, the DOJ would challenge the transaction. The DOJ's conclusion in
a business review letter does not bind the DOJ to inaction if it later decides
that the public interest demands a challenge. The DOJ could expand the
business review letter procedure to include the DOJ's evaluation on whether
a transaction submitted for review meets the Article 85 standards. If they
do, the legal effect of a decision not to prosecute could be made binding
on the DOJ, creating some of the certainty claimed to justify the
Amendments.
Either approach would require the DOJ to spend more time and
resources reviewing transactions for compliance with relevant statutory
standards. Delegating concomitant review authority to the FTC might
reduce some of this burden. Moreover, the current provision of the NCRA
requiring the DOJ to act within thirty days of receiving a business notifica-
tion1 93 might require extension. But the experience of the DOJ with the
NCRA review procedure and business review letters should minimize the
logistical problems that might otherwise result from adopting a review
standard similar to Article 85.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no reason to make transnational cartelization any easier. The
webs of interconnected joint ventures in the most oligopolistic of United
States industries can hardly be said to have made those industries more
competitive or consumers better off.'9 4 If the nation is concerned with
the competitiveness of United States firms in the global marketplace, the
way to make industries competitive is to require those industries to
compete. In the words of Harvard Business School Professor Michael E.
Porter, United States industries need
not less competition but more. Instead of relaxing antitrust en-
forcement, we should be tightening it. Mergers and alliances
193. 15 U.S.C. S 4305(b) (1988).
194. See generally Adams & Brock, supra note 3. For case studies of the effect of
transnational cartelization on the United States electricity, oil, uranium, chemicals, steel, artificial
fiber, and maritime shipping industries, see MIROW & MAURER, supra note 25.
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between leading competitors should be prohibited-they are good
neither for companies nor for America .... The proposal to
relax antitrust scrutiny of joint production ventures should be
quietly and quickly dropped.195
Nonetheless, abandoning the Amendments does not necessarily mean
that Congress must leave the antitrust laws applicable to transnational
production joint ventures completely unchanged. Article 85 of the Treaty
of Rome provides a good framework for future legislation. Adopting it in
some form or another would require businesses to demonstrate that
Congress meant to foster their type of joint venture, a step found nowhere
in the Amendments. It is futile to try to improve the global competi-
tiveness of United States industry by sacrificing the nation's consumers.
Although the Amendments would do just that, alternative proposals can
encourage truly procompetitive ventures without risking harm to con-
sumers. The time has arrived for some of those alternatives to enter the
debate.
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